Greek Cities Burning?

By George Gregoriou
The political explosion in Greece could not be a surprise. Was it the straw that broke the camelʼs back? It was not a single straw. Tons of straws are required before the camel collapses. The youth in Greece has been overloaded, by an accumulation of unresolved contradictions, all stemming from the Greek society. To put it bluntly, families failed in parenting, teachers failed in educating, and political leaders failed in governing. The result, an explosion in everyoneʼs face. The Economist (12/13/2008) puts it this way: “In health, schooling and other public services, bad state provision fuels a huge under-the counter market—creating in turn vested interests opposed to any change. Life is tough for youngsters with energy and talent but no cash or connections. To get anywhere, they spend all day in rotten state classrooms, then trek off to private night schools where the same the same teachers do a slightly better job in return for money. Anybody who negotiates those hurdles must then face a dismal job market—either a dreary, dysfunctional public sector or a private sector crimped by crooked tax inspectors and crazed regulators.”

The problems afflicting the Greek society are generational, with both major parties (New Democracy and PASOK) ruling in succession since the collapse of the junta in 1974. The Economist continues: “Serious as they are, many chronic woes have been masked, to some extent, by easy money: European Union subsidies, a boom in shipping, construction for the 2004 Olympics. With the world recession, the mask is coming off, and Greeceʼs politicians face a dilemma. Either they take on the vested interests that snarl things up, or the country risks forfeiting much of the economic and social progress that it has made.”

The Karamanlis government and New Democracy are the epicenter of this crisis. Karamanlis is holding onto power with two votes, and he is in the midst of a festering major scandal, a land swap with Vatopedi monastery on Mount Athos. Two of his ministers, George Voulgarakis and Theodoros Roussopoulos, had to resign. However, this land scandal pales in comparison to the current crisis, the mobilization of thousands of young men and women into the streets of Athens, Thesaloniki, and other cities throughout Greece. The Karamanlis rule will come to an end, if not now, at the end of its term.

Why the political paralysis? New Democracy, are at center-right party, represents the interests of the wealthy and a section of the middle class (small shopkeepers and retail stores), the backbone of its support. Ideologically, New Democracy has God, country, and property on its side. This ideology attracts voters across the ideological spectrum, especially traditional people, those still afflicted with the anti-communist legacy of the Civil War (1946-1949), and those who are suspicious of Papandreouʼs socialist rhetoric. Market fundamentalism is New Democracyʼs religion. It came to power by a slim margin and coasted along on the 4% economic growth stemming from the 2004 Olympic games development and the policies of PASOK. As it was stated above, it began to unravel with the land swap scandal and the global financial meltdown. However, the underlying causes are much deeper–the frustrations simmering for decades, under the rule of both major political parties. In the last two-three decades, neither party was able to deal with the festering economic and social problems, nor create a new strategy for real change in Greece. The only changes the Greek people experienced were the new (old) faces in the seats of power and the same political tinkering to give the impression that things were changing, but with the status quo and politics as usual, in place.

PASOK, the opposition party, and New Democracy are cut from the same cloth, with minor differences in ideology and policies. PASOK is a socialist party, in name only. It leans towards social democracy, which means shoring up market capitalist. Or it leans towards populist nationalism, which is necessary, if a party on the left wishes to share the nationalistic electorate with New Democracy. PASOKʼs membership includes wealthy men and women, an intelligentsia across party lines, and a section of the labor movement, which will not vote for the Communist Party (KKE). PASOKʼs mass base is rooted in the Papandreou family legacy, the anti-junta movement, and those identified with the left. When PASOK came to power in the 1980s and 1990s, it relied on socialist slogans, an anti-establishment platform, anti-NATO and anti-Americanism, and a ʽsocialistʼ direction in Greek politics. The socialist slogans were toned down. PASOK had to deal with Greeceʼs realities, Greeceʼs dependency within the capitalist metropolis, and the military threats from Turkey on Cyprus and the Aegean Sea. In the end, PASOK was forced to offer the same band-aid solutions to economic and social problems, which were systemic to the Greek political economy or resulted from New Democracyʼs market policies. Rhetoric aside, the two major political parties in Greece operated inside the market capitalist box.

What the market ideologues in Greece cannot get is this: since the days of Adam Smith (1776), the market has been beneficial to those who own capital, have access to political and social power and stimulus packages (tax breaks and government contracts and projects) to boost the economy—as it happened during the 2004 Olympics. This government largesse filters down to the middle strata, and jobs for workers, when the economy is doing well. New Democracy and PASOK follow this path: stimulate the market, maintain the social peace through a safety net, and make elbowroom for the next election. The margin of electoral victory by either party has been so small, there was no need for a new strategy, for real change in the Greek social formation.

Market fundamentalism and status quo politics are at the root of the current crisis. This is global, not unique to Greece. Yet, even in the best of economic times, the vast majority of Greeks were marginalized, with thousands fighting over the breadcrumbs falling off the tables. The breadcrumbs have been big or small, depending on the policies of the party in power. But, breadcrumbs, big or small, are still breadcrumbs. That is why the turn to the right by New Democracy) or the turn to social democracy PASOK, in the end, produced the same results. The electoral excitement has been to put their own party faces in government. But, as the electoral victory wore off, the voters were turned off, telling those in power ʽyou are just like the othersʼ. This cynicism, in fact, kicked in much sooner. The elected leaders and the partisan media would spend an enormous amount of time blaming each other for the economic and social ills afflicting the country. In the end, all political leaders sounded alike. This blaming game has been institutionalized in Greek politics, for decades.

This problematic in Greek politics seems insurmountable because it is systemic, and the political discourse (ideology, politics, economic, and social policy) among the two power blocs is confined within market capitalism. If the market is the cause of a crisis and both parties (PASOK and New Democracy) offer market solutions, what could be the results? The mark of insanity, psychologists say, is when one does the same things over and over again, and expects different results. This is Greek democracy, in action. Now, imagine trying to deal with the problems of those falling through the cracks of market capitalism, election after election, with and-aid solutions will not do. Market capitalism is what it is. No amount of tinkering will change the situation. To put this in perspective, the dire economic and social conditions I am referring to, for a large percentage of the Greek population, exist when the Greek economy is doing well. The levels of poverty, unemployment (21% for young people and 8% for the rest of the population), crime, the number of young men and women without a high school education or a trade, and millions of men and women kept out of colleges because of poor preparation or lack of money, were tolerated by New Democracy and PASOK. It is only when these statistics jump a bit higher, and a crisis is in the making, that the media puts them in print or the TV screen. The culture of the market capitalism is reflected in the discourse among and the young, and not so young: ʽI am doing OK, you are OKʼ, or ʽI donʼt give a damnʼ,—the attitude that dominates in many Greek families and in social relations, especially among teenagers, with so much energy and so little to do.

The collapse of global capitalism, spreading from Wall Street to the European Union, to Asia, South America, and Africa had its effects in Greece. The crisis reached unacceptable levels: big business and banks spinning out of control; signs ʽfinal saleʼ, ʽgoing out of businessʼ in every street, and the ranks of those thrown into the streets, without jobs or food for their families, multiplying into millions. Greece could not escape this global crisis, especially when its economy lacks dynamism in innovation and new technology. The Economist stated: “The worldʼs universities are full of Greek academics, but the countryʼs own campuses are dogged by poor administration, strikes and a state monopoly of higher education. In its university system Greece hews closer to the worst aspects of the Ottoman past (such as bureaucracies that block innovation) than does Turkey, with its fine range of public and private campuses.” Greece also, I stated above, relies heavily on tourism. The problem is larger than the politicians. Can you imagine [I was told in a conversation] what kind of an economy we have, if olives are shipped to Italy, to be pressed as Italian extra virgin oil, and fresh bread is flown daily to Greece from Brussels!

Young people do not take to the streets, like hooligans, without a reason. No one condones hooliganism. What are their goals? I was asked. They carry no picket signs and no leaflets, stating their demands. Why donʼt they make their demands, peacefully? They did, with their groaning and sad faces, down, roaming in the streets, with nothing to do. The death of Alexandros Grigoropoulos, the 15-year old schoolboy, did more than spark the riots. His death symbolizes the spark that shattered the peace of those who were the silent observers of this calamity, at all levels of the civil society, for decades. The denunciation of the youth violence in the media in Greece and the Diaspora (along party lines) reflects the criticʼs disregard of mass psychology, the pent-up frustrations, or a life without meaning or a sense of direction, as it was suggested above in The Economist. This youth malaise reflects not only the failure of the Karamanlis government and the Greek society to take the necessary steps to prevent or ameliorate the effects of a dead-end life on young people, addicted to alcoholism and drugs, which destroyed the lives young men and women and families, and an economy which, to repeat what I just stated above, relies heavily on tourism, a life on the fast lane, entertainment, and drugs. The money may be good, but the decadence that comes with it, is another story. This generational situation is embedded in the Greek culture, but it was exacerbated by the collapse of global capitalism and Greeceʼs economy. One has to ask, why did these youngsters resort to hooliganism, burning stores, or breaking windows? Did thousands of young Greeks become hooligans in just a few hours or days? Why did they not resort to constructive ways, even pointing to another direction? This explosion did not descend from heaven. This ʽhooliganismʼ reflects the existing state of affairs in Greece, not only the life of these children, but their families, their schools, the media, and the society and politics at large.

*****George Gregoriou, Critical Theory and Geopolitics
Professor Emeritus, Political Science Department
The William Paterson University, Wayne, NJ 07470
Visit my blog: www.neoleftcommentary.com